After losing the John Tavares sweepstakes, the Tampa Bay Lightning were right back in the news again looking to obtain defenseman Erik Karlsson from the Ottawa Senators. The Lightning passed on a deal at the trade deadline to bring Ottawa’s star defenseman to Tampa and instead acquired Ryan McDonagh from the New York Rangers. While Karlsson would’ve been a sexier pickup, McDonagh was a better fit to fill the shutdown role Tampa Bay was desperate to improve.
Last week, Tyler Dellow of The Athletic wrote an article pondering how Karlsson would improve the Lightning. He brought up Karlsson’s career powerplay production, Tampa Bay’s acquisition cost and injury concerns as well as the resulting salary cap implications an extension for the 2019 UFA would bring as potential red flags to consider as they get deeper into trade negotiations. While Dellow does have legitimate concerns, I do think the Karlsson’s fit into Tampa Bay’s powerplay and the resulting salary cap implications are greatly overvalued and Tampa should make the necessary moves in order to acquire Karlsson and sign him to a long-term deal.
Shutting out the opposing team is every goaltender’s objective when manning the crease. Hockey’s version of a perfect game in baseball takes both skill and luck in order to keep the opponent off the scoreboard. While the goaltender’s job is to stop the pucks fired at him, he doesn’t have direct control over the number or quality of the shots he faces.
This role falls on the goalie’s team which is heavily influenced by their system, penalty differential, and ability to execute among other factors. Some teams play a more sound defensive system that focuses on puck possession and retrieval where others play a more run and gun game sacrificing higher quality chances against in exchange for more odd man rushes for. Taking a penalty drastically increases the odds of allowing a goal while simultaneously decreasing the odds of scoring a goal for a short period of time. Racking up multiple penalties can wear a team out and lower their chance of winning the game if their penalty kill isn’t up to par.
On average, a goalie shuts out their opponent in seven percent of all regular season starts (it is possible for both starting goalies to record shutouts if the score is tied 0-0 heading into the shootout). As goalies don’t control the shots they face, can we determine if shutouts are team driven or strong individual performances by goaltenders?
Recently, I took time to update my shootout statistic project from a few years ago (now includes 4,500+ shootout attempts in 650+ shootouts). In addition to tracking every shootout from the 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 seasons, I went back and tracked two additional statistics to get a better understanding of the process before a shot attempt is made in the shootout. Tracking the shooter as he picked up the puck and skated down the ice, I noted what lanes of the ice he possessed the puck through and whether or not he crossed the Royal Road preceding an attempt on net. To compliment the shootout analysis, I also analyzed every penalty shot since 2012 to see how they compare to shootout attempts.
Contrary to popular belief, shootouts themselves aren’t luck-based but often involve a lot of luck. A strategy can be implemented by a team’s coaching staff to give their team a better chance at winning and picking up the important second point. This involves consistently taking attempts of higher quality to increase your expected shootout goals for. I’ll build on my original blog digging deeper into the elements of a successful shootout attempt before combining them together.
John Tavares was touted as a generational talent leading up to the 2009 NHL Draft and had an impressive resume that included being granted exceptional player status allowing him to play in the OHL at age 14, dominating the junior level and scoring at approximately a point per game pace in International tournaments. Since joining the Islanders organization, Tavares has continued to be a highly productive player, ranking 7th in the entire league in goals scored (235) and 9th in total points (537).
Tavares has performed very well but not to the hype he generated tearing up Junior hockey. He has only been voted in the top 10 for the Hart Trophy twice (finishing third in both 2012-2013 and 2014-2015) and has been named to just one postseason All-Star team (first team in 2014-2015). Tavares has also seen downfalls at the team level as the Islanders have only qualified for the playoffs in three of Tavares’ eight NHL seasons and made it out of the first round only once.
A lot of Tavares’ shortcomings can be blamed on Islanders’ management for not surrounding him with the players necessary to take the team to the next level. For teams at the bottom of the league, it is crucial to hit on top draft picks in order to restock talent within the organization and build a young core capable of competing for the Stanley Cup further down the road. Let’s look how the Islanders used their top draft picks to supplement Tavares in the lineup.
As the college and junior hockey seasons begin to come to a close in March, NHL teams have important decisions to make about their up and coming prospects. They can either shut their players down for the season or bring them up to the NHL/AHL to get a small preview of their playing potential at a higher level. This opportunity seems like a no brainer, especially for players management believe are too good for their current competition and are ready to make the next jump in their development to a professional league in the coming season.
When management makes the decision to audition a player at the next level, the only remaining hurdle is finalizing the prospect’s entry level contract (this issue is usually more prevalent for college hockey players as they can’t sign a professional contract while maintaining their amateurism where junior players have no restrictions). An entry level contract is limited by term (dependent on the prospect’s age at the date they sign the contract) and compensation but includes a provision for prospects aged 18 and 19 (as long as they don’t turn 20 before December 31 in the year they sign their first contract) that allows teams to slide the contract one year into the future if the player does not skate in a minimum of 10 NHL games (NHL CBA Article 9.1D).
Eligible prospects are allowed to skate in nine NHL games (combination of regular season and playoffs) without having the first year of their entry level contract kick in. For players that don’t qualify for the entry level contract slide, management has a much tougher decision to make. An older prospect’s contract will count against the salary cap during the season they dress for their first NHL game. In either case, this will not affect a player’s future unrestricted free agency as the requirements for most players (except Group 5 free agents but we expect these top prospects to play 80+ games before they turn 25) are seven accrued seasons in the league or turning 27 years old. A player must dress for 40 games in a season to accrue a season for free agency purposes and with only a handful games left in the schedule, this is impossible.
At the beginning of February, the Bruins were amidst a downward spiral, having lost six of their previous nine games, that could eventually see them miss the playoffs for a third straight year. During this streak, the Bruins were embarrassed 4-0 on home ice to the last-place New York Islanders and blew a 3-0 lead against the lowly Detroit Red Wings to eventually lose 6-5 in a shootout. The team had some obvious lack of depth on the wing, defense, and backup goaltender positions, but they weren’t winning the games that they should have. The Bruins were clinging onto the third and final divisional playoff position but having already played a handful more games than the teams closing on them in the standings, the Bruins only had a 35% chance of qualifying for the playoffs.
On February 7, the Bruins finally made the move that many were calling for the team to make since the end of last season. Head coach Claude Julien was fired and assistant coach Bruce Cassidy was promoted to Julien’s old position on an interim basis. Cassidy inherited the Bruins’ biggest issue of converting shots in goals. At the time of the firing, the Bruins had a 55.46% CF%, 53.22% SCF%, and a 55.83% xGF% but only a GF% of 45.22% (all metrics presented in this article are 5v5 and adjusted for score, zone & venue unless specifically noted). Despite consistently outshooting and outchancing their opponents, the Bruins were struggling because of their league-worst 5.97% SH% at even strength (non-adjusted). The result of this was scoring a league-worst 24 goals under their expected goal for total on the season (87.55 GF compared to 111.78 xGF).
In order to fix the Bruins’ largest problem, Cassidy had to find a way to way to generate higher quality chances. As we have just crossed the midway point of Cassidy getting promoted and the conclusion of the NHL regular season, now is a perfect time to check in on how he has been able to alter the Bruins system in order to spark a playoff rally.
Around the US Thanksgiving holiday every year, there is a lot of discussion surrounding the prediction of teams will qualify for the upcoming spring’s Stanley Cup Playoffs. Sportsnet’s Elliotte Friedman uses a November 1st as a guideline as teams four or more points out of the playoff picture at that date typically don’t make the playoffs. A few years ago, The Hockey News’ Ken Campbell wrote that just 10% of all playoff teams are more than two points out of the playoff picture by the US holiday. Last week, Petbugs wrote a great blog using December 1st as a cutoff point to examine a team’s underlying numbers and compare it to the full season data, noting the importance of advanced metrics, namely shot attempt metrics, as a strong indicator of future playoff qualifiers early in the season. Everyone came to their conclusions using a similar, yet different date. What is the optimal date to conclude a team is likely to make the playoffs based on the current standings? There will always be outliers as the future cannot be predicted (injuries, hot/cold streaks, etc.) but answering this million dollar question can help teams know where they stand and prepare for the future accordingly.
UPDATE: Revamped Design of Calculator and Included Up To Date 2018-2019 Salary Cap Information and Offer Sheet Compensation.
UPDATE: It appears a second invalid contract was signed since the 2016 offseason. Colton Parayko signed a 5-year, $27.5M contract on July 20, 2017. The original contract (tweet deleted but can be seen here) failed the league’s 35% variability rule and had to be later amended.
On the first day of free agency this past summer, the San Jose Sharks signed forward Mikkel Boedker to a 4-year, $16M contract ($4M average annual value (AAV)). The breakdown per year of the contract was $5M/$5M/$3M/$3M with a $1M signing bonus included in Boedker’s salary for the first two years of the deal. A few days later, the now defunct General Fanager reported that the NHL had rejected San Jose’s contract with Boedker as it violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Specifically, it violated the league’s 35% variability rule (Rule 50.7(a)). San Jose was able to shift salary from one year to another to satisfy the league’s variability rule and to keep the contract’s length and cap hit the same. Boedker’s contract now is broken down at $5.2M/$4.8M/$3M/$3M per year.
Since making his debut in the Calgary Flames’ final regular season game of the 2013-2014 season, Johnny Gaudreau has been one of the league’s most electric players. His 54 goals over the past two seasons ranks him tied for 23rd in the league which includes a handful of highlight reel and overtime game-winning goals. Since the 2007-2008 season, only two players (Steven Stamkos and Jonathan Toews) have scored more goals in their first two NHL seasons (occurring before their 23rd birthday). The main knock on Gaudreau is that his game is rather one-dimensional and at this moment, I’m not referring to his below-average goals against and shot attempts against statistics but rather his inability to produce on the road.
Edmonton Oilers defenseman Oscar Klefbom recently gave an interview to the Swedish website Hockey Sverige (English translation can be viewed here) and one his comments caught my eye. When asked about the Taylor Hall for Adam Larsson trade, he thought the team had improved and said,
“Taylor has been our best player in recent years, but it’s also hard to tell what he has contributed. He never played his best games against the tougher teams, which we really needed it. However, he was fantastic when we met the little worse [teams].”
It makes sense that players in general will score more points against weaker teams. Weaker teams usually lack depth and don’t have a top goaltender which is a recipe for giving up more goals against. Top players should be able to take advantage of this matchup mismatch. But is there any proof that Hall himself has racked up points against weaker teams but contributed less against stronger teams? Khlefbom has since updated his quote saying all of the Oilers key players have underperformed, but I will investigate his original comment to see if there is any merit behind it.